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Abstract
Climate change is seen as one of the most relevant challenges for the next coming years, politically and economically. The Dutch 
government has set targets to reduce national carbon emissions according to the commitments made in Paris in 2015. Since com-
panies substantially contribute to the level of carbon emissions, it is necessary to monitor their carbon emissions to see whether 
they fulfil their commitments. This research shows to what extent companies in the Netherlands (listed, non-listed family owned 
and a reference group we refer to as non-listed other companies) report their strategies, implementation and performance regarding 
carbon emissions and reduction. We find, not surprisingly, that on average listed companies are far more transparent than non-listed 
companies. Non-listed family owned companies are apparently not active or even not willing to be transparent about their carbon 
policy. However, we do find that several non-listed companies that score high in the Dutch Transparency Benchmark (non-listed 
other companies) are just as transparent about carbon emissions as AEX-listed companies that must report due to market regulation.
Furthermore, we find that most carbon disclosures are still of a mainly qualitative nature. This could imply that firms’ carbon dis-
closures are at present mostly a means of storytelling rather than a means of thorough analysis on how climate change risk might 
affect them and how they have to respond to mitigate these financial and societal risks.
Relevance to practice
If decision makers (politicians, finance institutions and boards of management) want to make sound policies and decisions, more 
specific and useful information regarding carbon emissions and climate change risks on an entity level is relevant.
Keywords
Carbon disclosure, listed companies, non-listed companies, Transparency Benchmark, Directive 2014/95/EU, non-
financial reporting
1. Introduction
During the early nineties of the last century, Dutch com-
panies started reporting on how environmental issues are 
related to their activities. These first environmental reports 
had a focus on soil, water and air pollution. From the turn 
of the century, the content of these reports changed into in-
formation on sustainability. Companies gave more attenti-
on to corporate governance, non-financial performance and 
outlooks, stakeholder dialogue, the supply chain, ethical is-
sues such as child labour and human rights, and on the im-
pact on climate and biodiversity (KPMG 2015). Several of 
these issues need to be looked at from a long-term perspec-
tive: creating long-term value without compromising the 
needs of future generations. Environmental reports evol-
ved into sustainability reports covering different domains 
of the public debate on sustainability. And more recently, 
prompted among other developments by the introduction 
of Integrated Reporting by the International Integrated Re-
porting Council and the recent adoption of the EU directive 
on non-financial reporting, the integration of separate sus-
tainability reports into the regular annual reports.
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The number of issues to include into corporate report-
ing has increased with the passage of time, resulting in 
bulky sustainability reports. The question that rises is how 
informative these reports actually are. In order to solve 
the problem of an overkill in information (the ‘take-a-lot’ 
approach), companies started to include a materiality ma-
trix into their annual reports. The materiality matrix gives 
insight in the most relevant issues companies should in-
clude in their strategy, performance and corporate report-
ing, based on a broad view on stakeholder interests.
In the meantime climate change has become extreme-
ly relevant, both because of the urgency to act and the 
potential of business to contribute to solutions and reduc-
ing risks. In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. This 
was an agreement–under the United Nations Framework 
Convention in Climate Change–that was established to re-
duce carbon emissions by introducing an emission trading 
scheme. Meetings in Marrakesh, Copenhagen and Paris 
followed the meeting in Kyoto. It took quite some years 
to reach a certain level of awareness and business com-
mitment. Since Paris 2015, where many countries agreed 
on quite radical targets regarding carbon emission reduc-
tion, the climate change topic became a hot topic. Leading 
companies in the business community also stood up, and 
made commitments (United Nations 2015), making clear 
that business has a large role to play. Climate change, both 
in terms of emission contributions to climate change and 
risk reduction of climate change, has become relevant in 
many materiality exercises leading to extensive informa-
tion disclosure about climate change and carbon emis-
sions in annual reporting (Knox-Hayes and Levy 2011). 
Frameworks have been developed for carbon-reporting 
(see, e.g., the Carbon Disclosure Project www.cdp.net), 
and there is a regulatory stimulus to use these, with the 
implementation of the EU Directive on non-financial re-
porting. In some countries (like France), carbon reporting 
has become an obligation for listed companies (Sewell et 
al. 2018). Carbon reporting is a way to provide relevant 
information to both shareholders and societal stakehold-
ers on how climate change will affect companies, and 
how that translates into company action and contribution 
to the Paris commitments. Being transparent about the up-
take of climate change issues in company decisions is the 
first step on the way to improved company performance 
and climate change impacts (Sewell et al. 2018). There 
is already broad interest from the finance community in 
carbon reporting by listed companies. Now a national 
climate agreement has been established in the Nether-
lands, it is the right time to investigate the current status 
of carbon reporting in the Netherlands of both listed and 
non-listed companies, to see how they make progress with 
the commitments and contributions to the national climate 
agreement. This setting leads to more precise wordings 
regarding our earlier question: what is the quality of the 
information currently being publicly reported by Dutch 
companies regarding their impact on climate as well as 
the impact from climate change on different aspects of the 
company’s activities and/or business model?
2. Purpose of the research
The purpose of this research is to explore how transparent 
companies in the Netherlands are about their impact on 
the climate and the impact from climate in their annual 
reports, and whether this is different for listed and non-li-
sted companies. For many years, sustainability reporting 
has been voluntary (Maas and Vermeulen 2015). As a 
result, companies developed their own criteria for repor-
ting, or used existing voluntary guidelines–such as those 
of the GRI and GHG-Protocol1–at their own discretion. 
More and more, financial actors (banks, pension-funds, 
investors) are taking non-financial issues into account in 
their investment and divestment strategies. Transparent 
reporting is an important source to inform these financial 
actors in this process (Sewell et al. 2018). Our research 
investigates if and to what extent pressure from regulati-
on based on the EU Directive on non-financial informa-
tion has impacted the volume and quality of reporting on 
and from climate change.
Since 2004 the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Climate performs a transparency benchmark on the 
quality of annual reporting by compiling information from 
reports of the largest 500 companies in the Netherlands 
(Ministerie EZ 2016). The goal of the Dutch Transparency 
Benchmark is to allow stakeholders to form a view on the 
quality of company disclosure on sustainability in order 
to facilitate discussions with company management about 
transparency and ultimately environmental performance. 
In addition, carrying out such a benchmark makes it pos-
sible to compare sustainability related disclosures among 
companies and stimulate others to follow best practices.
Up to 2017, sustainability reporting was a mostly 
voluntary activity. Since then, the reporting and dis-
closure about climate change and carbon emissions (as 
part of sustainability reporting) is influenced by regula-
tion. In 2017, the Dutch government implemented the 
EU Directive on non-financial information (Directive 
2014/95/EU). This directive requires large entities of 
public interest to report on sustainability issues (strat-
egy/policy, target setting, and performance), including 
climate change. The implementation of this directive 
may have increased the pressure on sustainability re-
porting by large Dutch listed companies and entities 
of public interest. For other companies sustainability 
reporting is still voluntary, whereas their performance 
on climate change issues is equally important to the na-
tional economy and society as this group also contains 
large companies with high environmental impacts. Our 
research aims at measuring–in addition to the over-
all transparency regarding climate impact and carbon 
emissions–the impact of the Transparency Benchmark 
and Directive 2014/95/EU on the depth of climate 
change transparency by comparing reporting practices 
of both listed and non-listed companies.
In the remainder of this article, we describe the general 
theories we use (Section 3) to develop our expectations (Sec-
tion 4). Next, we explain the research methods used to meas-
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ure sustainability disclosure and test our expectations (Sec-
tion 5). Then, we report our results (Section 6) and, finally, 
we give our conclusions and recommendations (Section 7).
3. Theoretical background
The theoretical background on motives for changes in 
public accountability and transparent reporting is based 
on four relevant theories (An et al. 2011): agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976), stakeholder theory (Free-
man 1983), legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) 
and signalling theory (Spence 1973). These are used here 
to formulate the expected results of this research.
Most of the companies that are eligible to the disclo-
sure pressure caused by the Transparency Benchmark and 
the implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU are the larg-
est listed companies. These type of companies, typically, 
have to deal with agency problems caused by the segrega-
tion of management and ownership. Public reporting is a 
means to reduce the problems caused by separating man-
agement and ownership of the firm. Conflicts of interest 
can occur between the management (the agent) and the 
owners (the principals) when both parties are unequal-
ly informed and their interests differ. Management has 
access to information sources that they can use to their 
advantage, whereas owners lack detailed information that 
impacts the supervision and monitoring of management. 
Sustainability reporting is part of public reporting and, 
therefore, can reduce agency problems.
The agency theory evolved into the stakeholder’s the-
ory. Companies can have more principals than just the 
owners and shareholders; clients, employees, govern-
ment, banks, suppliers, NGOs for example, can also be 
considered as principals. They, at least, are important 
stakeholders too. The number and type of stakeholders 
depend on the business of the company. These stakehold-
ers can be in a similar position as the owners, and they too 
can be in need of useful information, such as sustainabil-
ity information, for their decisions on what companies to 
trust, what products to purchase and how to engage with 
companies on improving their CSR strategies.
From an even broader perspective, the company has 
responsibility towards society as a whole. Companies 
should create and maintain their license to operate in so-
ciety. The legitimacy theory states that companies have a 
contract with society to act in compliance with societal 
norms, that are subject to change and opinion on what 
sustainable entrepreneurship entails. To proof their legit-
imacy, companies voluntarily report on issues of impor-
tance to society, like sustainability, to improve consumer 
and political trust.
Finally, companies can also–based on the signalling 
theory–communicate publicly to show their excellence. 
According to the signalling theory, companies that per-
form well with respect to climate-related issues will 
report on these performances to distinguish themselves 
from less performing competitors, and gain a competi-
tive advantage. Signalling will only be effective when 
the cost of reporting performance differs between good 
and bad performers. Although sustainability reporting is 
largely voluntary, the use of guidelines and standards as 
well as the possibility of an audit may support signalling 
as a reason for sustainability reporting, since the cost 
involved with adopting the guidelines and standards as 
well as auditing the resulting information can be lower 
for good performing companies. And the government 
in its turn can promote best practices based on bench-
marks, where the top performers are set as an example 
(naming and faming) for the whole sector, which adds to 
company reputation.
4. Expectations
The actual developments with regulations and benchmar-
king, and the theories for motives on public disclosure 
mentioned in section 3, led to the following expectations.
Companies that are highly ranked in the Dutch Trans-
parency Benchmark are expected to also be more trans-
parent regarding their impact on the climate and carbon 
emissions. Ranking in the Transparency Benchmark thus 
provides a predictor on carbon reporting quality.
Many large Dutch listed companies have been publish-
ing sustainability or integrated reports for several years 
already. Their motivation differs from liability to legiti-
macy and from accountability to responsibility. Based on 
the average high ranking of these companies in the annual 
Transparency Benchmark, we expect that listed compa-
nies will be more transparent on climate change and car-
bon emissions than non-listed companies.
Family owned non-listed companies are on average 
lowly ranked in the annual Transparency Benchmark. 
These companies have no or less agency issues. There-
fore, although they are subject to societal concerns and 
scrutiny, we expect these companies to be less transparent 
on their impact on the climate and carbon emissions.
The implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU in the 
Netherlands in 2017, which applies to reporting periods 
starting at 1 January 2017 or later, is likely to cause an 
improvement in the quality of climate-related informa-
tion in 2017 compared to annual reports over 2016.
We further expect that privately owned non-listed 
companies got inspired by the implementation of Direc-
tive 2014/95/EU and best practices on reporting of non-fi-
nancial information by large entities of public interest, 
and, thus, their reports became more transparent too. Ad-
ditionally, by following general sustainability trends and 
responding to societal concerns, the expectation is that 
they will adapt to increasing reporting practices of peers.
The GHG Protocol is a convenient framework for re-
porting carbon emissions. Based on earlier research (De 
Waard 2018) we expect that a growing number of com-
panies uses the GHG Protocol in their annual reports, the 
more so because it is referenced in Directive 2014/95/EU 
for reporting on this issue.
https://mab-online.nl
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5. Research method
To measure the transparency about climate impact in the 
annual reports of companies in the Netherlands this rese-
arch has investigated the annual reports 2016 and 2017 
of three categories of companies in the Netherlands. This 
work is inspired by a similar but less encompassing analy-
sis performed on annual reports of 2017 (De Waard 2018).
1 The first category of companies in our sample con-
sists of listed companies on the three market indices 
of the Amsterdam stock exchange, the AEX, AMX 
and AScX. These companies were chosen because of 
their visibility and therefore their liability to public 
scrutiny as well as the specific implementation of the 
EU Directive regarding annual reporting and trans-
parency (Sewell et al. 2018). Each index consists of 
25 companies. One company was dropped from the 
sample because it was listed in only one of the years 
of research (Adyen NV) which means that the annual 
reports of 74 listed companies are investigated.
2 The second group of companies consists of compa-
nies on the Elseviers’ list of top 100 family businesses. 
From this list, 4 companies were dropped (Heineken, 
VolkerWessels, HunterDouglas and Sligro) since these 
were listed companies in the years we investigated. 
These companies represent the group of large fami-
ly businesses with societal impact in the Netherlands 
that are also liable to public scrutiny. These non-listed 
companies, however, do face a limited level of regu-
lations regarding annual reporting and transparency in 
comparison with listed companies based on the Dutch 
Civil Code. That is the main reason for defining this 
group of companies as a separate category.
3 We complete our sample with the 27 highest ranked 
companies in the Transparency Benchmark 2017 that 
are not included in the other two categories. These 
companies were selected because of their high level 
of transparency. We restricted this group of compa-
nies to 27 because of time constraints. These com-
panies are also typical within the Dutch disclosure 
environment for high quality disclosure, and repre-
sent a category that serves for comparing the report-
ing quality of the other two groups and especially 
the other category of non-listed companies, the fam-
ily owned non-listed companies. We included these 
companies in our sample to provide a more complete 
picture of the transparency about climate impact of 
the most prominent Dutch companies.
Thus, the total number of companies involved in our 
research, is 197. These companies’ annual reports provide 
a good overview of the level of transparency regarding 
climate-related issues and carbon disclosures of the most 
prominent and transparent companies in the Netherlands 
in recent years. Because of their size and status, these com-
panies are likely to adopt the best reporting practices due 
to public pressure. Chithambo and Tauringana (2017), who 
investigated the transparency of UK companies, use the 
same argument in justifying the selection of their sample.2
The focal area of our research are the annual reports of 
2016 and 2017 of the selected companies. We also includ-
ed separate sustainability reports or other additional rel-
evant information, if publicly available. We particularly 
study the fiscal years 2016 and 2017, because the Direc-
tive 2014/95/EU became effective for entities of public 
interest for fiscal years starting in 2017.
Among the several existing benchmarks to assess the 
quality of carbon disclosures, the benchmark of Tauringa-
na and Chithambo (2015) is the most detailed one.3 There-
fore, we use this benchmark to measure the transparency 
about climate impact in the annual reports of companies 
in the Netherlands. The benchmark contains 60 criteria 
based on different reporting frameworks like the GHG 
Protocol, GRI Guidelines, Global Framework for Climate 
Risk Disclosure and more. In order to simplify the analy-
sis, we have categorized the criteria of the benchmark in 
three categories of information, that form a development 
path from intentions to realisation and accountability. The 
number of criteria differs per (sub)category:
1 Strategy: strategy and risk analysis, business model, 
corporate governance and policies;
2 Performance: actions taken, expectations, results 
and analytics;
3 Reporting: measurement and reporting standards.
The quality of the GHG disclosures was measured by 
assessing the 60 indicators and criteria of the climate-re-
lated information in the annual reports, CSR reports, 
sustainability reports and websites of the selected compa-
nies. Every criterion in the benchmark has a 0 or 1 score, 
which means that the maximum score per company is 60 
points. Research assistants consulted each other regularly 
and performed peer reviews on each other’s outcomes of 
the analyses (10% of the cases were scored double) in 
order to realise consistency. One of the criteria from the 
benchmark (Institutional background) scored a one for all 
companies in the sample. We, therefore, dropped this cri-
terion from the benchmark as it provides no distinguish-
ing information. The maximum score, thus, is 59 points. 
The detailed benchmark is included in the Appendix 1.
6. Results
6.1 Companies and overall scores
In the results section, we show the relative outcomes in 
percentages of the maximum potential scores for all se-
lected companies per category. Not every company re-
ports on climate-related issues and carbon disclosure as 
can be seen in Figure 1 in absolute numbers.
The highest score that was achieved by an individu-
al company is 30 points, which means that no company 
had a score of more than 50% based on the benchmark 
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criteria. The relative results per category of companies 
(expressed as a percentage of the total number of compa-
nies per category) after classifying the scores in three cat-
egories is shown in Figure 2. A low score is assigned for 
scores between 0–10 points, a moderate score for 11–20 
points and a reasonable score for 21–30 points.
The scores of the listed companies show a pattern that 
broadly corresponds with the three stock market indexes. 
The companies listed at the AEX have the highest score 
on average, the companies listed at the AMX have an 
average moderate score and the companies listed at the 
AScX have the lowest score, on average. The majority 
of the non-listed family owned companies score zero or a 
very low score. The majority of the non-listed companies 
selected from the Transparency Benchmark have a moder-
ate or reasonable score. This accords with the expectation 
based on their ranking in the Transparency Benchmark.
In the next section, we provide results in more detail 
for the three categories of companies in our sample.
6.2 Results in detail: Listed companies
Figure 3 presents the results for the listed companies. 
These results show an interesting pattern. The highest 
scores are in the strategic phase and the lower scores in 
the performance area. Almost all companies disclose a 
statement about the company’s position on climate chan-
ge and related responsibilities. But the lack of information 
regarding the risks and opportunities (the materiality of 
climate change for a company) prevents that higher mean 
scores are obtained for this theme. The same pattern is 
visible regarding information about the business model, 
the corporate governance structure regarding climate-re-
lated issues and the policies. For these three criteria, on 
average half of the companies present general disclosu-
res, but are silent about specific detailed information. A 
relevant difference between the 2016 and 2017 scores is 
that disclosures regarding climate change impact on busi-
ness operations–as part of the business model-criteria–in-
creased from 46% up to 54% (result not shown, part of 
indicators for the Business model).
As part of the performance phase, much of the listed 
companies (88% in 2016 and 95% in 2017) disclose their 
actions and/or measures taken to reduce or mitigate the cli-
mate change impact. Many companies, however, do pres-
ent no information regarding the use of green energy and 
the GHG emission offsets. Only very few companies do 
present their future estimates of carbon emissions. Regard-
ing the results (emissions)–which can be seen as one of the 
key performance indicators in this field–on average 50% 
of the companies disclose their total carbon emissions in 
metric tonnes and the same percentage disclose the results 
Figure 1. Number and availability of sustainability reports of 
the197 analysed Dutch companies. Non-listed E100 refers to El-
sevier top100 family owned companies, non-listed TB refers to the 
high scoring non-listed companies in the Transparency Benchmark.
Figure 2. Distribution of Carbon-disclosure scores for each of the distinguished company types, for the reporting years 2016 and 
2017. Non-listed E100 refers to Elsevier top100 family owned companies, non-listed TB refers to the high scoring non-listed com-
panies in the Transparency Benchmark.
https://mab-online.nl
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per business unit, type or country. Even less companies 
give information regarding scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions4 in 
absolute tonnes and an even lower percentage report com-
parative data. However, the number of companies using 
(part of) the framework of the GHG Protocol increased 
from approximately 41% in 2016 up to 46% in 2017.
Finally, regarding the measuring methods (average 
score 11%) and reporting criteria (average score 27%), 
about 43% of the companies disclose the conversion fac-
tors to measure and calculate emissions. Little informa-
tion is given regarding the methodology used to assess 
the performance and scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. On aver-
age, 61% of the companies report the reporting guidelines 
used. More detailed information about base year, bound-
aries, and facilities is reported on a lower scale, which 
results in a score of 27%. 38% of the reports contain an 
assurance statement on the disclosed information.
6.3 Results in detail: Non-listed (family owned) 
companies
The results from the benchmark regarding the climate 
disclosures of family owned companies–as presented in 
Figure 4 – show a general low level of transparency.
The total average score from the benchmark regarding 
all criteria is 3,2% in 2016 and 3,6% in 2017. Most of the 
family owned non-listed companies in our sample do not 
report their performance regarding climate change. Many 
of them do not even publish an annual non-financial re-
port at all, besides the mandatory financial statements 
filed at the Chamber of Commerce (and possibly a man-
agement report that should be available at the company’s 
office, which was not in the scope of this research).
The disclosures that did lead to a score show more or 
less the same pattern on the individual indicators as the 
scores of the listed companies presented in section 6.2.
6.4 Results in detail: Non-listed companies from the 
top of the Transparency Benchmark
Obviously, the other private companies that are ranked 
in the top of the Transparency Benchmark are the most 
transparent non-listed companies in their voluntary an-
nual reporting about the broad spectrum of sustainability 
subjects. Their average scores on carbon reporting exceed 
those of the other company groups. These companies’ 
disclosures regarding climate change could therefore 
function as a kind of basic state-of-the-art practice for 
transparency for Dutch companies.
Figure 5 shows that the other non-listed companies in 
the top of the Transparency Benchmark on average follow 
the same pattern in reporting as the listed companies, with 
regard to the indicators that score best or low. However, 
there are some marked differences. In the strategy phase, 
these companies are less transparent about the corporate 
governance structure regarding climate change, and more 
transparent about their policies and targets. In the perfor-
mance phase these companies are also more transparent 
regarding the concrete actions and results. The number 
of companies using (part of) the framework of the GHG 
Protocol increased from approximately 56% in 2016 up 
to 59% in 2017. The patterns in the reporting phase are 
similar to the patterns of the listed companies.
The score of the top of the listed companies (AEX) 
is comparable with that of the top non-listed companies 
of the Transparency Benchmark. This result can be in-
dicative for the influence of the public benchmarking of 
corporate disclosures in the Netherlands since the listed 
companies are included in the Transparency Benchmark 
too. The Transparency Benchmark, thus, seems to func-
tion as a catalyser for reporting about sustainability of 
Dutch companies, as does a listing on a public capital 
market as the AEX. The marked difference in transpar-
ency that we measure between the AEX-listed and the 
Figure 3. Results listed companies (n = 74). Percentages pres-
ent the share of the criteria that were scored positive within each 
theme.
Figure 4. Results non-listed family owned companies (n = 96). 
Percentages present the share of the criteria that were scored 
positive within each theme.
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non-listed TB-companies on the one hand, and the top 
of the family-owned companies at the other hand, shows 
that the family owned companies apparently feel no pres-
sure to be open about their climate policies. Based on the 
results in de Transparency Benchmark, we do not expect 
that other Dutch private companies will in general depart 
from the disclosure practices of the largest family owned 
companies in the Netherlands.
7. Conclusions and 
recommendations
7.1 Conclusions
Based on the results of the research the following conclu-
sions can be drawn regarding the expectations that were 
formulated in section 4. In Figure 6 the overall scores per 
category of companies and phase is presented.
As expected, companies listed on the AEX are indeed 
more transparent on climate change and carbon emissions 
than companies listed on the other two indices, AMX and 
AScX.
Non-listed family owned companies are on average 
much less transparent about their impact on the climate 
and carbon emissions. Most of the family owned compa-
nies do not even publish any form of non-financial disclo-
sures, let alone on climate change.
Non-listed companies in the top of the Transparency 
Benchmark are on average more transparent regarding 
their impact on the climate and carbon emissions than 
the companies in the other groups. The results for this 
category of companies is comparable with the top of the 
listed companies (AEX), that are also listed in the top of 
the Transparency Benchmark.
The implementation of the Directive 2014/95/EU in 
2017 did not result in any significant effect on the cli-
mate-related disclosures of large Dutch companies, as 
compared to the reporting in 2016. The main reason for 
this is that many of the companies that have to comply 
with this directive already reported climate-related dis-
closures on a voluntary basis in the year before. In ad-
dition, the current regulation on disclosure of non-finan-
cial information is in principle voluntary and therefore 
non-binding.
It is unlikely that the family owned non-listed com-
panies got inspired by the Directive 2014/95/EU, or by 
examples set by listed companies, nor by any stimulating 
effect of the TB-instrument.
The usage of the GHG Protocol by both listed and 
non-listed companies in the top of the Transparency 
Benchmark is increasing.
Based on our research findings we make the following 
general conclusion:
The benchmark we used for this research (taken from 
Tauringana and Chithambo 2015) is rather detailed. As 
a result, the top scores of the companies included in our 
Figure 5. Results non-listed companies TB (n = 27). Percent-
ages present the share of the criteria that were scored positive 
within each theme.
Figure 6. Overall results. Percentages present the average share of the criteria that scored positive within each phase.
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study are on average lower than 50% (from the maximum 
score). However, given the number and variety of the cri-
teria, this benchmark still provides sufficient possibilities 
to distinguish different companies. There is, of course, al-
ways room for further improvement. Overall, we consider 
the method suitable for measuring carbon reporting quality.
We detect no effect of the introduction of the EU direc-
tive on non-financial reporting. A comparative study on the 
implementation of the EU Directive in the Netherlands and 
other EU member states concluded that the Directive pro-
vides general guidelines only and leaves it up to companies 
to decide what issues are material (Sewell et al. 2018). Due 
to this non-binding character on what to report on, not many 
effects were to be expected from the Dutch implementation. 
The timing of the Dutch implementation also coincides 
with companies that are already being active with reporting, 
so the present Dutch implementation of the EU regulation 
more or less captures what is already the practice. The con-
clusion of Sewell et al. (2018) was that enabling conditions 
for additional effects of regulation on transparency and 
non-financial disclosure are hardly present and stimulating 
effects of the Dutch implementation are not very plausible. 
The present research confirms that low expectation.
Possibly, companies will have to learn about the inten-
tion of the Directive, and need time and more incentives 
to adapt to it and increase their level of disclosure (AFM 
2018). Ongoing monitoring of policy pressure and com-
pany responses is, therefore, needed to signal any impact 
of the EU Directive. The top-scoring companies that in-
clude climate-related disclosures in their annual reports 
mainly focus on the strategic impact, governance struc-
ture and actions to be taken. The disclosures regarding 
the companies’ performances (carbon emissions) in the 
field of climate-related issues are less detailed. Although, 
information about the carbon emissions in tons has been 
given, the analysis of performance and outlook in many 
cases falls short.
As was to be expected, the non-listed family owned 
companies are much less transparent. They indeed also 
score relatively low in the Transparency Benchmark. This 
is in line with the absence of any reporting obligation for 
these companies in the present Dutch regulation. Agency 
and legitimacy issues are less relevant in this type of or-
ganizations, as they do not have to defend their strategy 
to outside shareholders. Pressure will have to come from 
their own financiers, or from regulation.
The non-listed companies in the top of the Transparen-
cy Benchmark and the listed companies have in common 
that their non-financial disclosures are publicly visible and 
therefore more liable to public scrutiny. Both organization 
types are apparently aware of having to deal with a broad 
range of stakeholders and societal issues. This might be 
the reason why they try to close the information gap and 
to strengthen their license to operate, as well as showing 
their awareness regarding the relevance of climate change.
The different theories can provide further insights 
into the motives for different types companies to engage 
in mandatory versus voluntary reporting. This research 
shows that non-listed family owned companies apparent-
ly do hardly feel any pressure to account for their carbon 
performance. Proving legitimacy has been shown to be 
an important driver for companies in high-impact sectors 
such as mining, as a response to NGO criticism (Boiral 
and Heras-Saizarbitoria 2017). Listed companies have a 
different attitude, driven by legitimacy motives as they are 
obliged to report, but even more so by agency motives, as 
they already did so before the EU directive was implement-
ed. Lastly, the non-listed companies high in the TB use 
disclosure out of signalling motives, standing out amongst 
their peers provides them possibly with a competitive ad-
vantage. Being part of the TB group is a strategy that might 
be successful for this group. Overall, our research findings 
point out that the reporting about climate change and car-
bon emissions of Dutch companies is mainly of a qualita-
tive nature. They provide more narrative information (high 
scores in the strategy phase) than concrete quantitative 
analyses of their climate performance (low scores in the 
performance phase). This could imply that firms’ carbon 
disclosures are at present mostly a means of storytelling 
rather than a means of thorough analysis on how climate 
change risk might affect them and how they have to re-
spond to mitigate these financial and societal risks.
Tauringana and Chithambo (2015) performed an anal-
ysis of the trend in GHG disclosures for the largest com-
panies listed on the London Stock Exchange for the years 
2008–2011, using the same benchmark as we do. They 
report relatively low mean scores in the GHG disclosure 
index in 2008 of 25% that increases steadily over the fol-
lowing years to 39% in 2011. Of course, we cannot com-
pare these scores directly with ours, given that the periods 
differ as well as the regulatory conditions. However, their 
general conclusions are not so much different from ours. 
They also find substantial lower scores for quantitative 
disclosures as for qualitative disclosures, which they sug-
gest could imply that firms’ GHG disclosures are merely 
a means of story-telling that could be used to hide real 
actions. As a result, an increase in qualitative disclosures 
may even lead to less transparency and accountability.
7.2 Recommendations
In this research a general and detailed benchmark is used. 
It might be interesting to develop a benchmark that is 
more suitable for specific industries with a material im-
pact on climate change and industries that are influenced 
by climate change. The relevance of the impact of climate 
change and the associated risks on companies’ business is 
underexposed in the benchmark used.
Still, the used benchmark is able to distinguish compa-
nies, and room for company improvement is clearly present 
as the highest scores reach up to 50% of the possible maxi-
mum score. This diversified method can be used to develop 
a more refined criteria set of the Dutch Transparency Bench-
mark, where climate reporting should become a structural 
issue that deserves more attention. Merely mentioning cli-
mate change in a narrative way is not enough to provide in-
sights in company risks and mitigation measures. The most 
distinguishing indicators could be selected for this.
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If more concrete information about climate-related is-
sues–and more precisely the carbon emissions–is needed, 
it might be advisable to make use of the GHG Protocol in 
combination with detailed disclosures mandatory in an-
nual reporting for a large group of companies, at least the 
ones under Directive 2014/95/EU. And a more political 
choice has to be made on expanding the obligation from 
merely listed to also non-listed large companies.
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Notes
1. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a nongovernmental international organisation that promulgates sustainable reporting standards. The 
GHG-protocol is a widely accepted framework to measure and manage greenhouse gas emissions.
2. We realize that the criterion for selecting the third group of companies, namely their position in the Transparency Benchmark, may introduce an 
endogeneity problem. The reason for selecting this group of companies, however, is to provide a more complete picture of the transparency of 
prominent Dutch companies, i.e. companies eligible for public scrutiny, regarding climate disclosures in general. Our results, thus, give a more 
complete view of the effect of the implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU.
3. Other indexes used in the literature to quantify GHG disclosures are Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), Choi et al. (2013), and Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005).
4. The GHG-protocol distinguishes three types or scopes of greenhouse gas emissions. Scope 1 emissions refer to direct emissions from owned or 
controlled sources. Scope 2 emissions are indirect emissions from the generation of purchased energy. Scope 3 emissions are all other indirect 
emissions that occur in the value chain of the reporting company, including both upstream and downstream emissions.
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Appendix 1
Category Subcategories and criteria
Strategy Strategy and risk analysis
1 Statement about company position on climate 
change and related responsibilities
2 Climate-change opportunities and company 
strategies
3 Identification of regulatory risks as a result of 
climate change
4 Identification of all other risks as a result of 
climate change
5 Adaptation strategies to climate-change effects
6 Quantitative data estimates of the regulatory risks 
as a result of climate change
7 Quantitative data estimates of all other risks as a 
result of climate change
Business model
8 Climate-change impact on business operations, 
including supply chains
9 Regulated schemes to which the firm belongs
10 Information on any GHG sequestration
Corporate Governance
11 Corporate governance on climate change
12 Contact or responsible person for GHG reporting
Policies and targets
13 GHG emission targets set and achieved
14 Comparative information on targets set and 
achieved
Performance Concrete measures and actions
15 Actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate 
climate-change impact
16 Disclosure of the supplier and the name of the 
purchased green tariff
17 Information on GHG emission offsets
Future outlook
18 Future estimates of total GHG emissions in CO2 
metric tonnes
19 Future estimates of scope 1 emissions
Category Subcategories and criteria
20 Future estimates of scope 2 emissions
21 Future estimates of scope 3 emissions
Results
22 Total GHG emissions in CO2 metric tonnes
23 Comparative data on total GHG emissions in CO2 
metric tonnes
24 GHG emission by business unit/type/country
25 GHG removals quantified in tonnes of CO2e
26 Scope 1 emissions
27 Comparative data on scope 1 emissions
28 Scope 2 emissions
29 Comparative data on scope 2 emissions
30 Scope 3 emissions
31 Comparative data on scope 3 emissions
32 Emission of direct CO2 reported separately from 
scopes
33 Emission not covered by the Kyoto Protocol and 
reported separately from scopes
34 Emission attributable to the firm’s own generation 
of electricity/heat/steam sold or transferred to 
another organisation
35 Emission attributable to the firm’s own generation 
of electricity/heat/steam purchased for resale to 
end-users
Analysis of results
36 Explanations for changes in performance of total 
GHG emissions in CO2 metric tonnes
37 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 
1 emission
38 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 
2 emissions
39 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 
3 emissions
40 Reduction in tonnes of CO2e per year for 
purchased green tariff
41 Additional carbon saving associated with the tariff 
as a percentage
42 GHG emission performance measurement against 
internal and external benchmarks, including ratios
Reporting Measuring methods
43 Conversion factors used/methodology used to 
measure or calculate emissions
44 Explanation for any changes to methodology or 
conversion factors previously used
45 Information on the quality of the inventory 
(eg causes and magnitude of uncertainties in 
estimates)
46 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions 
from scope 1
47 Explanation for the reason for any exclusion from 
scope 1
48 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions 
from scope 2
49 Explanation for the reason for any exclusion from 
scope 2
Reporting criteria
50 Period covered by the report
51 Reporting guidelines used in GHG reporting
52 Assurance statement on disclosed information
53 Organization boundary and consolidation 
approach
54 Base year
55 Explanation for a change in base year
56 GHGs covered, including those not required by 
the Kyoto Protocol
57 Sources and sinks used/excluded
58 A list of facilities included in the inventory for 
GHG emissions
59 Explanation of any country excluded, if global 
total is reported
